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Abstract	
This thesis investigates whether different types of dictatorships construct their state 
apparatuses in different ways, resulting in higher or lower levels of state capacity. Arguing 
that income taxes is the hardest form of taxes to collect – and thus is a good indicator of the 
state’s overall fiscal capacity – the thesis hypothesize that party-based autocracies should 
display higher levels of fiscal capacity compared to other types of dictatorships, for three 
reasons: Firstly, party-based regimes tend to have longer time-horizons than most other types 
of autocracies. Secondly, they often have greater incentives than others to invest in the fiscal 
capacity of the state. Thirdly, due to the highly institutionalized nature of party-based 
regimes, they avoid the fear, incompetence and bad information that plagues many other 
dictatorships. Using time-series analysis with panel data covering 80 countries for the period 
1980-2010, the thesis finds strong – but not complete – support for the hypothesis. 
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“The development of state power, or the state’s authority of society and the market economy, 
is usefully examined by highlighting its ability to get citizens to do something that they would 
rather not do – namely, pay taxes.” 
 
Evans Lieberman (2002) 
 
 
 
“Different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from 
democracy.” 
 
Barbara Geddes (1999) 
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1.	Introduction	
Over the last couple of decades’ social scientists have once again become interested in the 
state’s role in social and economic development. With few exceptions, social scientist of 
every stripe agree that states are necessary to regulate markets, provide public goods1 and 
maintain order (see, for example, Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skopcol 1985). 
 
To do these things, however, states must be capable and – as the burgeoning literature on 
“failed states” shows – at least in some sense “strong” (Brinkerhoff 2005). For this reason, 
many researchers have turned their attention to what is often called “state capacity”, (Hanson 
& Sigman 2013; Cingolani 2013; Soifer 2012) or states “infrastructural power” (Mann 1984; 
Soifer 2008). Although definitions vary, the observation underlying the concept is that the 
degree to which governments policies are implemented – or have the intended effect – differ 
tremendously between states. Put differently, some states are more effective than others to 
maintain order, implement policies or collect taxes. 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of this far-reaching research agenda is the relationship 
between political regimes and the strength and characteristics of the state apparatus (Bäck & 
Hadenius, 2008). Many studies have contrasted democratic with non-democratic regimes in 
relation to state capacity, as in the debate about “sequencing” (Carothers 2007; Fukuyama 
2007; Mansfield & Snyder 2007). In short, the discussion concerns whether democracy makes 
it easier or harder to “build up” the state. Some argue that it may be better – from the 
perspective of effective public goods provision – to establish “credible enforcement” before 
“credible commitment”, rather than the other way around (D’Arcy & Nistotskaya, 2016). Yet 
others have showed that democratic institutions, such as competitive elections, under certain 
conditions spur improvements in state capacity (Slater 2008).  
 
What is far less common, however, is comparative studies that explore differences in state 
capacity within the group of non-democratic regimes. This is unfortunate, because – as put by 
one of the world’s foremost scholars on autocracies, Barbara Geddes (1999, p. 121) – 
“different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from 
democracy”. 
 
More precisely, various types of autocracies rely on different sections of society for support, 
have different kinds of decision-making procedures, chose leaders in various ways and 
respond to societal pressure in different manners. If we believe that political institutions have 
at least some effect on the level of state capacity (for an overview of the different types of 
explanations often found in the literature, see Bräutigam et al. 2008) it seems strange not to 
explore this variation in the world of autocracies further. 
 
There is, however, as least one study that looks at the variation in state capacity within the 
group of non-democracies. In their paper “Which dictators produce Quality of Government?”, 
Charron and Lapuente (2011, p. 399) investigate “how different forms of authoritarianism… 
build up their state apparatuses in characteristically different ways”. 
 
This thesis builds upon Charron and Lapuente’s work, but approaches the theme in a 
somewhat different manner. It contributes to the existing field of research in at least two 
ways. Firstly, it is theoretically anchored in the literature on state capacity rather than the 
																																																						
1 Of course, a capable state apparatus can also be used for unambiguously bad things. Indeed, some of the worst 
atrocities in human history was committed by vicious regimes in control of a high capacity state. 
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literature on “quality of government”, and uses a more precise definition of its key concept. 
Charron and Lapuente defines quality of government as “an uncorrupted and efficient public 
bureaucracy... a legal system that is impartial (non-discriminatory) and enforces contracts and 
citizens’ private property rights” (2011, p. 400). Although there is much to appreciate in 
Charron and Lapuente’s study, the author of this thesis finds this definition too broad. 
Moreover, although things like protection for private property and an impartial public sector 
free from corruption may often be found in strong states, “quality of government” and “state 
capacity” should not be treated as the same analytical concept. 
 
Secondly, contrary to Charron and Lapuente – and much other previous research – this thesis 
does not rely on expert evaluations as indicators of “bureaucratic effectiveness” and the like. 
Instead, it uses an objective measure – income taxes as share of GDP – to measure the 
effectiveness of the tax system, one of the core functions of the state. 
 
By using the autocratic regime classification first presented by Geddes et al. (2014) as the 
independent variable, and collected income taxes as share of GDP as my dependent variable, 
the thesis show that party-based autocracies display higher levels of fiscal capacity than 
personalist and military regimes. Employing a time-series analysis with panel data, covering 
80 countries for the time-period 1980-2010, the results hold even when including demanding 
control variables such as GDP per capita, population density, state antiquity, regime duration 
and several others. Despite lack of data for several potentially important cases, there is strong 
reason to believe that the results are not driven by selection bias. Additional robustness 
checks somewhat weakens the results, but do not change them overall.  
 
2.	Outline	of	the	thesis	
The outline of the thesis is as follows. Section 3 presents an overview of the state capacity 
concept. The section discusses some of the problems with how the concept has been 
understood and operationalized, arguing that researchers should be clearer on which type of 
capacity they are investigating. The thesis then goes on to discuss the fiscal capacity of the 
state – i.e. the ability to effectively raise taxes from its territory and population – in some 
detail, arguing that taxation tells us something important about the strength and reach of the 
state. 
 
Section 4 deals with the question of how to categorize different types of non-democracies, 
followed by section 5 where a theoretical argument for how autocratic regimes could impact 
state capacity is presented. Section 6 discuss available data and research design. The results 
are presented in section 7. Section 8 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
3.	The	state	capacity	concept	
State capacity has been understood as the durability and autonomy of the state’s organizations 
(Huntington 1968), as states’ ability to execute policies “cleanly and transparently” 
(Fukuyama 2004a), as the ability of state leaders to get people in society “to do what they 
want them to do” (Migdal 1988), and in numerous other ways. Quite often, state capacity is 
used interchangeably with other concepts such as “quality of government” (see for example, 
Charron & Lapuente 2011), often understood as an impartial public sector free from 
corruption. As the heart of most definitions of state capacity, however, lies the ability of states 
to enforce policy – to change the status quo – even in the face of societal resistance (Mann 
1993).  
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A first step to make sense of the conceptual confusion surrounding the concept may be to 
follow in the steps of Cingolani (2013) and Hanson and Sigman (2011). In their respective 
reviews of the concepts and measurements of state capacity, they start off with the basic 
question: Capacity to do what? 
 
Cingolani shows that the term may refer to as many as eight different aspects of capacity: 
coercive / military; fiscal; administrative / implementation; transformative or industrializing; 
relational/territorial coverage; legal; and political. Hanson and Sigman makes a rather similar 
summary of the existing state capacity literature, and argues that researchers should focus on 
three core dimension of the concept: extractive, coercive, and administrative capacity. These 
three dimensions, they argue, capture almost all core functions of the modern state (see 
Pierson 2004). 
 
While these clarifications are helpful, the research on state capacity also suffers from another 
weakness. In short, the problem arises from the difficulty in trying to measure the capability 
of the state, rather than various outcomes. These are different things, because even if a certain 
actor has the ability to do something, he or she may not necessarily choose to do it.   
 
For example, Hendrix (2010) discuss how a researcher may use the number of military 
personnel per capita as a proxy for the coercive capacity of the state. This means that states 
with small armies will be seen as having relatively low state capacity, and countries with large 
armies will be seen as having high state capacity. This does not have to be misleading. It 
could be the case that the state with a small army would like to have a much bigger military 
force, but is unable to achieve this. However, it could also be the case that the people in 
control of the state apparatus could raise a much larger army rather quickly if they wanted to, 
but for some reason choose not to. If so, trying to estimate the capacity of the state by using a 
certain outcome as a proxy may give us biased results. 
 
This potential weakness in the state capacity literature is clearly described by Lindvall and 
Teorell (2016), who argue that we can never measure state capacity directly. Instead, we 
should think of state capacity as “the strength of the causal relationship between the policies 
that governments adopt (p) and the outcomes that they intend to achieve (y)” (2016, p. 14). 
 
This way of thinking about state capacity has close resemblance to how political scientists 
often understand power: The ability of X to make Y do something Y would not otherwise 
have done (Dahl 1957). Rather than trying to measure power directly, political scientists 
generally try to gauge different actors’ power resources, and Lindvall and Teorell argue that a 
similar approach should be taken by researchers interested in state capacity. Thus, they invite 
us to think more about the resources at the governments disposal, rather than various 
outcomes. According to Lindvall and Teorell, there are three broad types of resources –
money, human capital, and information – that the state can use to increase the likelihood that 
the government’s policies have the intended effect. 
 
The author of this thesis is sympathetic to the theoretical argument presented by Lindvall and 
Teorell. In the best of all possible worlds, research on state capacity should focus more on the 
various resources at the state’s disposal. Recent studies along those lines – which specifically 
tries to assess and quantify states’ informational resources – include Brambor et al. (2016), 
Lee and Zhang (2016) and D’Arcy and Nistotskaya (2017). 
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However, we do not live in the best of all possible worlds. In practise, it is not always feasible 
to distinguish between resources and outcomes. Moreover, while some studies – such as the 
ones mentioned above – have shown that it is possible to empirically gauge certain state 
resources, most empirical indicators available to researchers are not of this kind2. For this 
reason, most researchers interested in state-capacity are still forced to use measures that 
captures outcomes rather than resources. The theoretical distinction between the two is 
nevertheless important, since it reminds us to be cautious when interpreting results based on 
“outcome-type” empirical indicators. With this in mind, we move on to discuss the type of 
state capacity which is the focus for this thesis – extractive, or fiscal capacity. 
 
3.1.	Taxation	as	state	capacity	
As described above by Cingolani and Hanson and Sigman above, the ability to tax is often 
seen as one of the core characteristics of the state (see also Levi 1988). Douglas North goes 
even further and defines the state in terms of its capacity to tax. According to him, the state 
can be understood as “an organization with a comparative advantage in violence, extending 
over a geographic area whose boundaries are determined by its power to tax constituents” 
(North 1981, p. 21). 
 
Numerous scholars have noted the close connection between the capacity to collect taxes and 
the step-by-step creation of the modern state, especially in Western Europe (see for example 
Tilly 1975; Tilly 1992). With a few exceptions – such as the prevalence of abundant and 
easily extracted natural resources – some type of taxation is necessary for the continuation 
and upholding of the state over time, no matter where in the world it is located. 
 
This does not mean that governments cannot be supported by other forms of revenue. Some 
countries in the world rely heavily on international aid. Others derive substantial amounts of 
money from the operations of state-owned companies. Taxation, however, is a very specific 
form of revenue for at least three reasons: Firstly, unlike aid-payments – which are 
conditional on some other states’ goodwill or strategic interests – taxes are something that the 
state itself decides on, and which emanates from within the countries own borders. Secondly, 
while fees such as – for example – a highway-toll tend to be given with the explicit 
understanding that the money will be used to fund infrastructure, taxes are paid without 
promise of any specific service or good in return3. Thirdly, taxes are compulsory, meaning 
that a citizen, company or consumer is forced to pay the taxes he or she owes. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that researchers have used taxation as a way to 
estimate the capacity of the state. As put by Lieberman (2002, p. 92), “the development of 
state power, or the state’s authority of society and the market economy, is usefully examined 
by highlighting its ability to get citizens to do something that they would rather not do – 
namely, pay taxes”. Following Lieberman, a central assumption for this thesis it that taxation 
tells us something important about states’ capacity. 
																																																						
2 Furthermore, even when there exist empirical indictors that explicitly captures state resources rather than policy 
outcomes, these indicators may not be suited to all estimation strategies. The author of this thesis has tried to use 
a novel “legibility-index” constructed by Lee and Zhang (2016) – which captures the accuracy of national 
censuses – for the research problem presented here. In the end however, the number of observations was too few 
to permit meaningful analysis. 
3 Of course, taxes of often collected and paid with an implicit understanding that the money will at least partly be 
used for some kind of goods provision. Indeed, the extent to which citizens think that their tax money will be put 
to “good use” may often affect their willingness to pay said taxes. However, when the state collect taxes from an 
individual or company, there is no promise that this money will be earmarked and used for a specific project in 
return.  
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However, all taxes are not equal. As pointed out by Lieberman as well as numerous other 
scholars, some taxes require much higher levels of state capacity than others. At the low-end 
of the capacity spectrum we find trade-taxes, such as tariffs on goods. Since most imports and 
exports tend to enter and exit a country at a few major ports or border towns, it is relatively 
easy for a state to set up customs stations and collect taxes there. Historically, this has often 
been the most important form of revenue for many countries in the world. Examples of taxes 
that requires some capacity – but not necessary high levels of capacity – include payroll- and 
domestic consumption taxes. 
 
The most difficult form of tax to collect – and which therefore requires the highest levels of 
capacity – is arguable the income-tax (Chaudry 1997; Lieberman 2002; Rogers & Weller 
2014).  
 
Taxes on personal income, on capital gains and on companies’ profits requires extensive 
coverage, monitoring and enforcement. As put by Mares and Queralt (2015, p. 1975), income 
taxes involve a “sophisticated tax administration capable of verifying the income of 
individuals in a given economy, and ensuring the compliance of the latter with their tax 
obligations”. This view is echoed by Piccolino (2015, p. 3), who argues that direct taxes on 
income and profits, “require fine-grained information on social and economic activities that 
cannot be obtained by coercion alone”. For this reason, such taxes tend to spur “the 
development of a state’s administrative apparatus”. 
 
While income taxes are hard to collect – i.e. they require high levels of capacity – they also 
have a number of properties that make them attractive: The tax base is wide, revenue stream 
tend to be relatively stable over time, and they distort the economy to a comparatively low 
extent. As put by Rogers and Weller, “income tax systems, especially once automated, are the 
steadiest and most lucrative form of tax revenue”. 
 
To summarize, for a state to derive any meaningful amount of money from income taxes, it 
must have detailed information not only about the whereabouts of its citizens and companies, 
but also about their economic activities. It’s not enough for the state to know the value of their 
assets (which is a prerequisite for an effective property tax) – rather, it must know how much 
money every individual or company made each month or year4. For this to happen the state 
has to be “present” in peoples’ everyday lives, and preside over an advanced bureaucracy. 
However, once an income-tax system is put in place and maintained, it offers clear benefits to 
the state, compared to almost all other forms of government revenue. 
 
Thus, while more general information about taxation – such as the total amount of taxes 
collected – arguably tells us something about the capacity and reach of the state, income 
taxation is a better proxy for the extractive capacity of the state. In this, the thesis follows 
previous studies by Lieberman (2002), Rogers and Weller (2014), and Brambor (2016). 
 
Following these studies, and relating to the overall theoretical section above, this thesis 
understands state capacity in general terms as states’ ability to effectively implement policy. 
Talking about fiscal capacity specifically, this is understood as states’ ability to effectively 
generate revenue through taxation. 
 
																																																						
4 Income taxes are taxes on a “flow”, rather than on a “stock”. 
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4.	Categorizing	autocracies		
In recent decades, political scientist has started to distinguish between different types of 
autocracies in a more systematic manner. Arguably, the two most commonly used 
classification schemes today are the ones constructed by Cheibub et al. (2010), and by Geddes 
et al. (2014)5. 
 
For the individual researcher, the different ways to categorize autocracies prompts an obvious 
question: which categorization should be used? The author of this thesis agrees 
wholeheartedly with Charron and Lapuente (2011, p. 407) that “the choice of classification 
should be based primarily on which source best suits one’s theory”. In the context of this 
thesis, this means that the theoretical explanations for why and how different regime-types 
may affect state capacity should direct the choice of classification.  
 
In the next section, the theoretical arguments for how and why we expect some regimes to 
invest more in state capacity than others are presented in more detail. In short, however, the 
theoretical argument is that the extent to which a ruling organization of some kind can 
constrain the executive plays a key role in how the regime functions. In some regimes, power 
in concentrated in the hands of a single “all-powerful” dictator. In other regimes, power is 
exercised by and through an organization of some kind – often a political party or the 
military. Drawing upon existing research on autocracies, the author of this thesis argues that 
this plays a crucial role in how regimes’ constructs their state apparatus’, resulting in higher 
or lower levels of state capacity. 
 
Given this theoretical point of departure, which classification scheme should be used? Below, 
the two most common ways to categorize non-democracies – Cheibub et al. and Geddes et al. 
– are compared. This comparison leads the author of this thesis to conclude that the regime 
classification provided by Geddes et al. is the most suitable. 
 
4.1.	Comparing	regime	classification	schemes	
Cheibub et al. argues that autocracies can be classified according to the characteristics of the 
“inner circles” of different regimes. Following this rule, they divide dictatorships into civilian, 
military and royal dictatorships. In monarchies, this “inner circle” tend to be made up of kin 
and extended family. In military regimes, the inner sanctum tends to be made up of officers 
from the armed forces. Contrary to both military and royal autocracies, however, civilian 
regimes do not have any “ready-made organization on which to rely” (Cheibub et al. 2010, p. 
86). This means that civilian dictators quite often have a regime party that helps them to rule. 
 
At a first glance, the classification strategy used by Cheibub et al. seem relatively similar to 
the one advocated by Geddes et al. The “autocratic regime dataset” constructed by Geddes et 
al. is a continuation of the seminal work by Geddes (1999), which defines regimes based on 
“the rules that identify the group from which leaders can come and determine who influences 
leadership choice and policy”. The so-called leadership group “makes key policies, and 
regime leaders must retain the support of its members to remain in power, even though 
leaders may also have substantial ability to influence the group’s membership” (Geddes et al. 
2014, p. 314-315). 
 
With this as their guidance, Geddes and her co-authors divide the world of non-democracies 
into party-based autocracies, military regimes, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic, 
																																																						
5 There are, of course, other categorization schemes as well. See, for example, Hadenius and Teorell (2007). 
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indirect military, or hybrids6 of the first three. The data-set constructed by Geddes et al. also 
includes a simplified categorization, where only the four main regime-types – party-based, 
military, personalist, and monarchy – are included (more on this in section 6 and 8 below).   
 
In party-based autocracies, leadership selection, the control of policy and over the security 
apparatus resides with a ruling party. In military regimes, the same role is played by the 
military, and in monarchies by the royal family. In personalist regimes, the ruling group is 
smaller than in other regime-types, and is tied much more closely to the individual dictator. 
Oligarchy refer to regimes where leaders are selected in competitive elections, but where a 
majority of the population is disenfranchised7. The classification “indirect military rule” is 
used to capture regimes where political leaders formally are chosen by elections, but where 
the military nevertheless controls key policy choices and or actively prevents certain parties to 
participate in the election. 
 
Table	1	Regime	classification	schemes	
Cheibub et al. (2010) Geddes et al. (2014) 
Civilian dictatorships Party-based autocracies 
Military dictatorships Military autocracies 
Royal dictatorships Personalist autocracies 
 Monarchies 
 
Note: The four regime-types in the right column refers to the simplified regime categorization provided by Geddes et al. 
 
The first thing that one notes when comparing the two classifications schemes (see table 1) is 
that Cheibub et al. do not distinguish between party-based autocracies and other types of 
civilian regimes. What about, for example, the “strong-man rulers” in many countries in 
central Asia, who took power after the collapse of the Soviet Union? In Cheibub et al. 
classification, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan of today are coded as civilian regimes – but so is 
China, which is ruled by the Chinese communist party. In the data-set constructed by Geddes 
et al., China is coded as a party-based autocracy, while Azerbaijan and Tajikistan are labeled 
“personalist” regimes. 
 
Another difference between the two classification systems is seen in how they treat the 
category “military regimes”. Despite what at a first glance seem to be relatively similar 
definitions, Cheibub et al. code more than twice as many country-years as military regimes 
than Geddes et al. does. For example, while the rule of Mobutu in Zaire is coded as a military 
regime by Cheibub et al., Geddes et al. classifies the regime as personalist. The same goes for 
Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda – a military regime according to Cheibub et al; a personalist 
regime in the eyes of Geddes et al. 
 
Commenting specifically on the case of Uganda under the reign of Idi Amin, Geddes et al. 
(2014, p. 323) writes that they coded the regime as personalist “because Amin marginalized 
most of the military from decision making”. This quote is revealing: For a regime to be coded 
as military according to Geddes et al. the military as an institution must have substantial 
influence on policy, and some ability to constrain the ruler. A typical example is the military 
junta governing Brazil between 1964 and 1985, “in which senior officers, in consultation with 
a small number of civilians, picked each successive president in keeping with rules specified 
																																																						
6 For example, Chile under Augusto Pinochet is coded as “military-personal”, and Cuba during Fidel Castro’s 
reign is coded as “party-personal”. 
7 Oligarchic regimes make up a very small percentage of total country-years in the dataset constructed by 
Geddes et al. South Africa under apartheid is probably the most prominent example of this regime-type.  
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by the institutions of the authoritarian regime” (Geddes 1999, p. 124). A country where the 
dictator came to power through the military, but who then consolidated power around his own 
person and marginalized the armed forces from decision making, will be coded as a 
personalist regime by Geddes et al. By contrast, Cheibub et al. codes all regimes where the 
“effective head” of government is a current or past member of the armed forces as a military 
regime (2010 p. 87). 
 
The usage of the personalist regimes-category also has implications in other cases. For 
example, although Juan Perón in Argentina founded the Justicialist Party to support him, he 
nevertheless maintained “a near monopoly over policy and personnel decisions” (Geddes 
1999, p. 124). Thus, Argentina in the early 1950’s is coded as a personalist regime by Geddes 
et al., and not as a party-based regime. 
 
The distinction between personalist regimes – where power is concentrated in the hands of 
one individual – and other regimes, where an organization of some kind can constrain the 
ruler, plays an important role in this thesis theoretical argument for why some autocracies 
display higher levels of state capacity than others. Thus, for this particular thesis, the regime 
classification scheme provided by Geddes et al. is deemed superior. 
 
5.	How	may	regime-type	affect	state	capacity?	
There are many theories that aims to explain the great variation in state capacity seen around 
the world (see, for example Besley & Persson 2009). However, since this thesis concerns the 
effect of regime-type on state capacity, many other types of explanations are left out of this 
theoretical section8. 
 
Having surveyed the literature on autocracies and on state capacity, the author of this thesis 
finds three factors that seems highly relevant: The time-horizons of the ruler; the dictator’s 
incentives for investing in a sophisticated tax-system, and the dynamics between the dictator 
and other parts of his “inner circle”, or ruling elite. 
 
Below, each of these three factors is described one-by-one in relation to the different regime-
types used by Geddes et al. The section end with a summary of the theoretical argument and a 
hypothesis. 
 
5.1.	Rulers’	time-horizons	
With inspiration from economics, it is increasingly common to view state capacity as an 
investment problem (Besley & Persson 2011). To create – for example – an effective taxation 
system, the regime must invest resources that could have been used for something else “right 
now”, in the hope that the taxation system will bring higher yields sometime in the future. 
 
This way of thinking about state capacity – as something that the regime in power may choose 
to “invest in” – fits nicely with the overall understanding that the state apparatus is something 
that is being built up gradually over time (see for example Fukuyama 2004b). One example of 
this is D’Arcy and Nistotskaya’s (2016) work with creating an indicator for states’ monitoring 
																																																						
8 In other words, just because this thesis deals with political regimes as a predictor of fiscal capacity, this does 
not mean that this is the only – or, for that matter the most important – factor explaining the strength and reach 
of the state. Other predictors often found in the literature include, for example, the history of “stateness” and of 
international wars, economic structure, and dependency on aid. 
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capacity. Using the extent and quality of cadastral records, the indicator they create is not so 
much the “flow” of state capacity, as its “stock”. 
 
Thinking of state capacity as an investment problem then leads to the question: Why do 
certain non-democratic regimes invest in higher levels of extractive capacity than others? 
 
A literature review suggests that a crucial factor influencing investment decisions is ruler’s 
time horizons and discount rates (see for example Levi 1988) – i.e. to what extent the ruler 
value the future relative to the present. As put by Besley and Persson (2011, p. 40), 
“incumbents weight the present costs of investing against uncertain future expected benefits”.  
 
Of course, by definition dictators do not have to worry about being ushered out of power 
through democratic elections. However, this does not mean that all non-democratic regimes 
are equally stable. On the contrary, a large body of research shows that some types of 
autocratic regimes are clearly more durable than others (Haggard & Kaufman 1995; Geddes 
1999; Geddes et al. 2014). In short, military regimes are the most short-lived, followed by 
personalist regimes. Party-based regimes are comparatively long-lived, but not as durable as 
the monarchies that survived the first decades after the World War II9. 
 
Leaders in regimes which – on average – tend to survive for longer periods also tend to have 
longer time-horizons. Thus, we would expect such regimes to invest more in state capacity. 
 
However, while regime duration may serve as a proxy for rulers’ time horizons (see for 
example Lapuente & Nistotskaya 2009), it is not the whole story in autocracies. One reason is 
that the way autocratic leaders are treated after they are removed from power also differs a lot 
depending on the type of dictatorship. As shown by Geddes et al. more than two thirds (69 %) 
of leaders in in personalist dictatorships face either exile, imprisonment or death10 when 
ousted from office. A similar fate happens to dictators in party-based autocracies only 37 
percent of the time. Military regimes and monarchies are somewhere in between. Moreover, 
personalist regimes very rarely survive if the leader himself is removed from power. Party-
based autocracies and monarchies, however, are much better at transferring power from one 
person to another. 
 
Moreover, the individual dictator in party-based regimes can hope to live a “good life”11 even 
after he or she steps down from power, since there are institutions in place to ensure the 
transfer of power and the continuation of the regime. Even in the event of a regime collapse, 
leaders in party-based autocracies are more likely than not to have a “good life” after they 
leave office. Thus, the leader of a party-based regime that has ruled for twenty years will 
likely have a longer time-horizon that the leader of a personalist regime that has been in 
power for the same amount of time. 
 
For this reason, we would expect monarchies and party-based autocracies to invest more in 
taxation capacity than other regime types. 
 
																																																						
9 In the full dataset constructed by Geddes et al., covering the period 1946-2010, the mean regime-duration for 
military regimes is 7 years (the range going from 1 to 26). The mean-duration for personalist regimes is 12 (1-
48), 23 for party-based autocracies (1-85) and 54 for monarchies (1-269). 
10 This refers to unnatural deaths. In other words, a dictator who is removed from power because he died of 
natural causes is not included in this category. 
11 In this context, having a “good life” means not being killed, imprisoned or exiled.  
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5.2.	Incentives	to	invest	in	fiscal	capacity	
Another type of explanation focuses on rulers’ incentives. Put differently, do certain types of 
non-democracies have a bigger interest in building a refined tax-collecting system than 
others? 
 
At a first glance, the question may seem strange. A sophisticated tax-system means that the 
dictatorships can extract resources from their population more effectively. Which dictator 
would not want that? There are, however, some theoretical reasons for believing that the 
incentives to construct an advanced tax-system are conditioned by regime-type. 
 
As mentioned in the section above, military regimes are – on average – the most short-lived 
regime-type. According to Geddes (1999), this is in no small part due to the fact that military 
regimes are not primarily interested in governing12. In fact, Geddes argues that the standard 
assumption that rulers of all kinds want to remain in power may be disregarded when it comes 
to military regimes (1999, p. 125). This is because professional soldiers the world over – 
despite the huge cultural, ethnic and socioeconomic differences between them – tend to value 
the efficacy and survival of the military itself more than anything else (DeCalo 1976; 
Kennedy 1974). 
 
The reason for a military take-over is often either the fear of civil war – which risks putting 
soldiers of the armed forces against one another – or that the privileges and resources of the 
military itself appears to be threated. If conflicts within a military regime becomes overly 
aggravated, most officers would rather “return to the barracks” than fight and kill fellow 
soldiers. If the military receives guarantees from a would-be civilian government that their 
privileges will remain intact13, they will often accept stepping down from office. 
 
For this reason, military officers are unlikely to have any great interest in building up the 
state’s extractive capacity. Their primary objective is to preserve the military as an institution, 
not to rule the state. 
 
Both personalist and party-based regimes differ from military autocracies in that both types of 
regimes want to rule. Moreover, both personalist and party-based regimes maintain their grip 
on power in part by distributing resources and services to key social groups in society 
(Bratton & van de Walle 1997). Since these resources must come from somewhere, these 
regimes have a clear incentive to increase the effectiveness of the tax-system. 
 
However, personalist and party-based regimes differ from one another when it comes to the 
size of their support groups. In personalist regimes, the “selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003) tend to be quite small. As put by Geddes (1999, p. 133) personalist regimes 
“distribute benefits and office to a smaller proportion of citizens than do single-party regimes, 
and the group of beneficiaries is more likely to be dominated by a single familial, clan, ethnic, 
or regional group”. In contrast, party-based often rely on a broader segment of the population 
for support and are less likely – compared to personalist regimes – “to limit their clientele to 
particular clan, regional, or ethnic groups” (1999, p. 134). 
 
																																																						
12 Of course, many military take-overs have resulted in more long-lived dictatorships, where an officer 
centralizes power around himself and stays on. In Geddes et al. terminology, however, this represents a shift 
from a military to a personalist regime. 
13 Such guarantees are often given. Civilian government who returns to power after a period of military rule are 
often keen to “keep the military happy”. 
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Because of these differences, party-based autocracies have even greater incentives than 
personalist regimes to build up an effective tax-system. Since party-based regimes depend on 
broader segments of the population for support, they also need to generate more revenue than 
personalist regimes. Personalist regimes can often keep their small support-group happy – and 
their leaders can often live in luxury – even with the modest revenue streams collected by a 
more primitive extractive system. 
 
To summarize, party-based autocracies have the greatest incentives for investing in the 
extractive capacity of the state, followed by personalist regimes. Military regimes have weak 
incentives to build up the state apparatus in any way, apart from the military. Fundamentally, 
they are rarely interested in ruling at all. Lastly, it is hard to find theoretical arguments one 
way or the other for monarchs’ incentives14. 
 
5.3.	Regime	institutions:	Dynamics	between	leaders	and	elites	
As argued in previous sections, high levels of taxation capacity require a sophisticated 
administrative apparatus. This is especially true for the collection of income taxes, which, in 
the words of Piccolino (2015, p. 3), “require fine-grained information on social and economic 
activities”. 
 
However, this information is obviously not gathered and systematized by the rulers 
themselves. As put by Greif (2007) the aspirations of rulers “are nothing but a wish without 
an administration to implement them”. In other words, in order to build up an effective 
administrative apparatus – capable of collecting and synthesizing different kinds of 
information about the populations economic activities in order to tax them – dictators must 
delegate some power to competent advisors. This, however, is far from easy. 
 
In Frantz and Ezrow (2011), a simple theoretical model is presented which aims to explain 
variation between autocracies. Drawing upon the regime distinction first developed by 
Geddes (1999) the idea is that the institutional setup of regimes affect the relationship 
between the leader and the “elite coalition”. 
 
In certain autocracies – such as military or party-based regimes – the dictator cannot 
singlehandedly choose the people who make up the inner circle of the regime. He, too, must 
adhere to the military or party organization, which tends to have rules and procedures for how 
people are chosen for different positions, how policy decisions are made, and so on. In 
personalist regimes, by contrast, the dictator is more or less free to fill the cabinet and other 
powerful positions with his own lackeys. Just as important, personalist dictators are also free 
to dismiss – and sometime even exile or kill – members of their elite coalition if they 
displease him. 
 
These institutional differences between regimes have huge implications, for several reasons. 
As shown by Egorov and Sonin (2011) many dictatorships face a trade-off between 
competence and loyalty in their subordinates. The reason is straightforward: Even though all 
dictators would like to have competent agents working for them, more competent 
subordinates also pose a threat to the ruler. Capable bureaucrats and high-ranking officials 
may start to build up their own power-base within the regime, with the long-term goal of 
replacing the dictator with themselves. Or they may choose to side with a rival to the dictator, 
which – because of their competence and deep information about the inner workings of the 
																																																						
14 This appears to be a large research gap. Filling it, however, goes beyond the boundaries of this thesis. 
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system – may very well be the thing that tip the scales in the rivals’ favor. The counteract this, 
many rulers “sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates” 
(Egorov & Sonin 2011, p. 903). In short, paranoia and fear lead dictators to rely not on the 
most able, but instead on the most trustworthy servants. 
 
It is not hard to find anecdotal evidence for such a “competence loyalty trade-off”. Young and 
Turner (1985) tells us the story of how Mobutu in 1978, just overnight, fires nearly 10 % of 
all officers because he doubted their loyalty. Thompson (1998) describes how the chauffeur of 
Philippine’s dictator Ferdinand Marcos was appointed chief of all security forces. And 
Gordon and Trainor (2006) explains how Saddam Hussein – despite external threats to the 
regime – put incompetent (but loyal) administrators in key positions because he feared a plot 
against him. 
 
Another kind of argument – but with similar consequences – is presented by Wintrobe (1998). 
According to him, autocratic rulers are often faced by an information problem which he calls 
the “dictators dilemma”. In short, the idea is that subordinates in an autocracy are unwilling to 
share their information with the dictator since they may fall in disgrace if delivering bad 
news. For this reason, servants of all kinds will tell the dictator what he wants to hear – but 
because the dictator understands this, he will not trust any information given to him. This 
argument is developed further by Papaioannou and van Zanden (2015), who claims that this 
“disinformation trap” is one of the key reasons for bad economic decision making in many 
dictatorships. 
 
Frantz and Ezrow argue – and present some empirical results indicating that this is the case – 
that the problems identified by Wintrobe, Egorov and Sonin are especially salient in 
personalist regimes15. In such a regime – where loyalty and position is tied to the individual 
dictator, who concentrates almost all power to himself personally – fear is often a constant 
part of the inner life of the regime. High officials are afraid to bring bad news to the dictator; 
the paranoid ruler, in turn, fears plots and treason from all sides. In such instances, regime 
personnel are typically “rotated frequently to prevent them from developing autonomous 
bases of support, and erstwhile supporters who become rivals or dissidents are quickly and 
unceremoniously excluded from office, influence, and sometimes life” (Geddes 1999, p.133). 
 
In other types of dictatorships, however, this is not necessarily true. Military and party-based 
regimes – as classified by Geddes et al. – are characterized by the fact that members of the 
leadership group can constrain the executive. Conflicts, disagreements and power struggles 
are mediated by the institutions in place. To various extent, it is the military or party as an 
institution that governs in such regimes. Thus, high ranking bureaucrats in a party-based 
regime tend to be loyal to the party rather than to the individual leader. The individual dictator 
in such regimes – powerful as he may be – may not be able to single-handedly remove a high-
ranking official who displeases him. And a bureaucrat who falls out of favour with the ruler is 
less likely to risk exile or death than in personalist regimes. 
 
																																																						
15 Egorov and Sonin note themselves that the “competence-loyalty trade-off” is an especially severe problem in 
certain kinds of autocracies, namely what they – following Linz and Chehabi (1998) – calls “sultanistic 
regimes”. Examples include Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Duvalier in Haiti, Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu in 
Zaire, Batista in Cuba and Marcos in the Philippines. As put by the authors “each of the regimes has been 
characterized by the selection of dictator’s subordinates based on personal loyalty”. Although Egorov and Sonin 
do not cite Geddes themselves, the similarity between Linz and Chehabi’s “sultanistic regimess” and Geddes et 
al. “personalist regimes” is obvious. 
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For this reason, the problems described above are likely less severe in military and party-
based regimes. Monarchies fall somewhere in between. In monarchies, power resides in a 
single individual, the king. However, the extended royal family and the court may act as a 
constraint on the executive. Unlike personalist regimes, monarchies also have an established 
way of transferring power from one person to the next, meaning that the ruler’s fear of being 
overthrown in a coup from within are lower in monarchies than in personalist regimes. 
 
Taking the dynamic between dictators and administrators into account, we expect military and 
party-based regimes to display higher levels of state capacity, compared to personalist 
regimes. 
 
5.4.	Summary	of	theoretical	argument	&	hypothesis	
Because it is hard to rank the three factors described above in any meaningful way – that is, it 
is not obvious if time-horizons matters more than incentives; if the dynamic between the 
dictator and his elite coalition is more important than the other two factors, etc. – it is very 
hard to theoretically predict exactly how each regime-type perform in terms of taxation 
capacity. 
 
Based on the discussion presented above, I argue that, compared to other autocracies, party-
based autocracies have the most effective taxation system. They have strong incentives to 
invest in the extractive capacity of the state (since they need revenue to distribute to a broad 
segment of the population), they have long time-horizons, and because of the highly 
institutionalized nature of the regimes, they avoid the fear, incompetence and bad information 
that plagues many other dictatorships. 
 
Military regimes are also institutionalized, but tend to have short time-horizons and lack 
incentives to increase taxation capacity. Personalist regimes have shorter time-horizons than 
party-based autocracies, and because they are characterized by fear and mistrust, have great 
trouble creating a functioning administration. Monarchies are expected to end up somewhere 
in between.  
 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. Compared to other types of autocracies, party-based regimes are associated with 
higher levels of fiscal capacity. 
 
6.	Data	and	research	design	
As explained in the theoretical section above, income taxation is used as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of the taxation system. More precisely, the indicator used is the amount of 
money raised from income taxes as a percentage of GDP, for each given year. The variable 
comes from the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (Wilson Prichard & Goodall, 2014). 
Because of the skewness of the distribution, the variable is logged. 
 
The main independent variable – regime-type – is taken from the autocratic regime data-set 
constructed by Geddes et al. (2014). More precisely, I employ the simplified version of the 
regime-classification, which means that only the four “pure” categories party-based, military, 
personalist and monarchy is used. This means that hybrid-regimes and subgroups are also 
classified as belonging to one of these four groups. Specifically, “party-personal-military”, 
“party-personal” and “party-military regimes” are all coded as party-based autocracies, as are 
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oligarchic regimes. “Military-personal” and “indirect military regimes” are coded as military. 
Since the regime-categories are mutually exclusive, they are represented by four dummy-
variables, which take on the value of “0” or “1”. 
 
The variable regime-duration – which measure the number of years the regime has been in 
power at any given year – is also taken from Geddes et al. (2014). Regime-duration is an 
important control, because we expect regimes with longer time-horizons to invest more in 
state capacity. Although regime duration is not a perfect measure of time-horizons – as 
explained in the theoretical section above – it tells us something about how short-sighted 
rulers are. Due to the skewness of the distribution, this variable is also logged. 
 
Several other controls are also included: Richer countries are likely more able to afford the 
costly enterprise of building up an effective extractive apparatus. Therefore, GDP per capita 
(Gleditsch 2002) is included. Theoretically, we would expect more densely populated areas to 
be easier to tax. For this reason, I control for population density (Word Bank 2016). 
Furthermore, many studies (see for example Chaudhry 1997) have shown that abundant easily 
extracted natural resources leads to a less developed tax system. Thus, oil-rents relative to 
GDP (World Bank 2016) is another control. In a similar vein, dependency on foreign aid can 
cause regimes to under-invest in taxation capacity (see Bräutigam et al. 2008). Thus, I also 
control for received aid as share of GDP (Williamsburg, 2016). Due to the skewness of the 
distribution, these variables are all logged. 
 
One potential weakness with the regime classification offered by Geddes et al. is that the 
“party-based regime” category may refer both to single-party states – where only the ruling 
party is allowed – and to what many scholars refer to “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 
2015). Such regimes may have elections of some kind, but are nevertheless not deemed 
democratic16. De facto power still resides within one party. In order to capture the difference 
between single-party states and “electoral authoritarian” regimes, I follow Charron and 
Lapuente and include the political rights variable from Freedom House (2016). The variable is 
inverted, meaning that higher values indicate more political freedom. 
 
Since state capacity is something that is being built up gradually over time, many scholars 
argue that historical legacies are important predictors for present day levels of capacity (see, 
for example, Acemoglu & Robinson 2012; Broms 2016; D’Arcy & Nistotskaya 2017). I 
control for the history of “stateness” using the state antiquity index17 constructed by 
Putterman (2007). 
 
In a similar vein, Tilly (1975; 1992) has famously argued that the main driver behind 
European states’ efforts to construct an effective tax system was war. A hostile international 
environment meant that states needed bigger and better armies. In order to achieve this, they 
had to find new and more effective ways to tax their population. This, in turn, lead to more 
money spent on the military, prompting other states to invest even more in their extractive 
capacity. In order to capture the potential influence of historic wars on present day levels of 
																																																						
16 Elections may be rigged; the mass media not allowed to report freely; freedom of organization may not be 
respected, etc.  
17 The state antiquity index exists in a number of versions, with different discounting rates (0, 1, 5, 10 and 50 %). 
A higher discounting rate means that the distant past is deemed less important compared to the recent past. In 
this thesis, the state antiquity index with a 10 % discounting rate is used. Although one can debate which 
discounting rate that is the “right one”, all version of the state antiquity index except the one with a 50 % 
discounting rate correlate with one another above the 0,9 level. 
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taxation capacity, I include the number of years each country has been involve in inter-state 
wars between 1816 and 1979, taken from the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees & Wayman 
2010). This variable is also logged. 
 
Since it is very unlikely that authoritarian regimes are just randomly spread throughout the 
world, regional dummies (Hadenius & Teorell 2007) are also used as controls. Summary 
statistics for all variables used in the regressions can be found in the appendix (Table 5). 
 
To test the hypothesis, I employ a linear cross-sectional, time series model using random 
effects18, correcting for first order autocorrelation (AR 1). The method to compute 
autocorrelation is based on Durbin-Watson. The statistical software used is STATA. 
 
The main reason for using a time-series model is the possibility of change in the main 
independent variable over time – i.e. the regime-type in a given country may change – as well 
as changes both upwards and downwards in other variables over the years. In order to at least 
party tackle the problem of reversed causality, all independent variables are lagged one year. 
This means that the value of a predictor – for example regime-type – for the level of income 
taxation in year q, is taken from the previous year (q-1). The logic behind this is simple: if X 
is supposed to have a causal effect on Y, then X must happen before Y in time. Lagging all 
predictors follows the practice in previous research (see for example Bäck & Hadenius 2008). 
 
Lastly, all models – although not displayed in the regression tables or figures below – include 
year-dummies for all years in the sample except the first one. The inclusion of year-dummies 
– i.e. year-fixed effects – aims to control for aggregate time-series trends. Put differently, it 
could be the case that both my dependent and independent variables move up- or downwards 
over time due to some global trend. If that was the case and we failed to include year-fixed 
effects in the regression, we may mistakenly interpret a correlation as a causal relationship. 
 
 
Figure	1	Illustration	of	the	model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
18 A Hausmann-test clearly indicated that random effects should be used. 
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6.1.	Sample	
The source of my independent variable – the autocratic regime data-set – covers all country-
years in the post second world war-era, up to 2010. Data on revenue from income taxes from 
the ICTD dataset, however, are only available as far back as 1980. This means that the time-
period is restricted to 31 years, from 1980-2010. 
 
Moreover, as is common in comparative politics, data is often missing for some observations. 
For example, even if we have information on regime-type for a certain country-year, it is not 
certain that we have data on income-taxation for the same country-year. This problem tends to 
get bigger the more control-variables one enters in a regression. Thus, it is very common that 
the first model in a regression table (often including only the main independent variable) has a 
much higher N than the last displayed model (including all control-variables). 
 
Although this is very common – even in peer-reviewed articles – it is not ideal. What we in 
fact are doing when comparing two such models with one another is comparing two 
regression models based on different samples. To counteract this problem, all main regression 
models in this thesis will have the same N (the largest number of observations for which there 
is data on all independent and dependent variables): 1041 country-years.  
 
However, there is still the possibility that this sample of 1041 observations is in some 
fundamental way different compared to the population as a whole. In the last section, where I 
discuss the regression results, I come back to the question of whether the sample bias the 
results in any way, and how it may affect the interpretation of the results. 
 
7.	Results	
The regression results are presented in table 2 below. The focal relationship is displayed in 
model 1. Since the main independent variable – autocratic regime-type – is represented by 
dummy-variables, one of the regime-types is excluded from the regressions. In these models, 
the excluded dummy-variable is party-based regime. This variable is the reference-category, 
meaning that the coefficients for the other regime-types is interpreted as the change in the 
dependent variable when moving from a party-based autocracy to another type of 
dictatorship. 
 
The coefficients for personalist and military regimes are both statistically significant and 
negative. Compared to party-based autocracies, personalist and military regimes collect less 
money in income taxes. The fact that the dependent variable is logged means that a one unit 
change in the independent variable (i.e. going from a party-based autocracy to another type of 
autocracy) should be interpreted as a 100 * the coefficient % change in the dependent 
variable. In other words, according to Model 1 personalist regimes derive 21 % less money in 
income taxes as share of GDP then do party-based autocracies. Military regimes collect 
roughly 25 % less money in income taxes compared to party-based dictatorships. This should 
be seen as substantial effects. 
 
The coefficient for monarchies, however, is not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot draw 
any conclusions about systematic differences between monarchies and party-based 
autocracies when it comes to income taxation. 
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Table	2	Regression	results	
Income-taxes (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Personalist -0.21** -0.203** -0.207** -0.203** -0.202** -0.224** 
Military -0.254*** -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.278*** 
Monarchy -0.066 -0.058 -0.056 -0.045 0.003 0.082 
       
GDP pc. (log)  0.178*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.189*** 
Regime duration (log)  -0.031 -0.031 -0.03 -0.03 -0.033 
Population density (log)  0.01 0.012 0.016 0.029 0.064 
Political rights   -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 
Oil-rents (log)    0.006 0.008 0.005 
Aid, share of GDP (log)    0.008 0.008 0.009 
Years of international wars (log)     0.056 0.053 
State antiquity index (10 % disc)     -0.0008 -0.0008 
       
Region, Eastern Europe / USSR      0.172 
Region, Latin America      -0.253 
Region, MENA      0.007 
Region, East Asia      0.421 
Region, South East Asia      -0.181 
Region, South Asia      -0.594* 
       
Constant 1.135 -0.187 -0.163 -0.28 -0.148 -0.259 
R2 (overall) 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.28 
Observations 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 
Countries 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Years (maximum) 30 30 30 30 30 30 
 
*p£0.05 **p£0.01 ***p£0.001 
All models include dummies (not reported in the table) for all years in the sample except one (1980). 
The reference-category for regime-types is party-based regimes. The reference-category for regions is Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
In model 2, some additional controls – GDP per capita, regime duration and population 
density – are introduced. The coefficients for personalist and military regimes are still 
statistically significant, and the size of the effects remain substantially the same. As before, 
the effect of being a monarchy compared to a party-based autocracy is not statistically 
significant.  
 
While regime duration and population density are not statistically significant, GDP per capita 
is. As expected, the coefficient is positive, meaning that richer countries collect more money 
in income taxes. The overall R2 increases substantially in Model 2 compared to Model 1, 
which probably is due to GDP per capita being an important predictor for income tax 
collection. 
 
Model 3 introduces political rights as a control. However, the coefficients from Model 2 stay 
more or less the same. Personalist and military dictatorships are still statistically significant, 
while monarchies are not. Political rights is not statistically significant, meaning that the 
extent of political freedom doesn’t matter for income tax collection one way or the other. 
 
Model 4 and Model 5 introduces even more controls: Oil-rents, received aid, state antiquity 
and history of wars. Despite these additional controls, military and personalist regimes are 
still statistically significant and negative, compared to party-based autocracies. The size of the 
effects is also rather similar compared to the first model –  the main difference being that the 
coefficient for military regimes has gone from -0.254 in Model 1 to -0.292 in Model 5. As in 
previous models, monarchies are not statistically significant. GDP per capita remains the only 
significant control variable. 
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Lastly, Model 6 also include regional dummies. Here, the reference category is Sub-Saharan 
Africa. As before, military and personalist autocracies are statistically significant, while 
monarchies are not. The negative coefficients for personalist and military regimes are 
relatively similar to previous models (-0.224 and -0.278 in model 6). The effect of GDP per 
capita is still significant and positive. The only new control-variable that is significant is the 
regional dummy-variable for South Asia. In Model 6 – with the introduction of regional 
dummies – the overall R2 increases to 0,28. 
 
To summarize, party-based autocracies have higher levels of income-taxation compared to 
personalist and military regimes in all different model specifications. The difference between 
party-based dictatorships and monarchies, however, is not statistically significant. Thus, we 
find strong support for the hypothesis (H1) in the data. 
 
8.	Discussion	
Based on Figure 2 (see appendix), and the fact that the regressions presented in section 7 
already corrects for serial autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity does not appear to be an issue. 
The correlation matrix (Table 9, appendix) as well as further tests (STATA’s variance 
inflation factor command) indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem either. However, 
several other factors that may affect the interpretation of the results also needs to be 
discussed. 
 
As touched upon in section 3 above, a potential weakness in the research on state capacity is 
that it often tries to measure the capability of the state by looking at various outcomes. This 
can be a problem, because even if a certain actor has the ability to do something, he or she 
may not necessarily choose to do it. 
 
This criticism could be levelled at this thesis as well. One could argue that the results above 
shows not that party-based autocracies display higher levels of taxation capacity than other 
dictatorships, but merely that they have a preference for higher taxes. A possible way to at 
least partly counteract this criticism would be to include a control-variable that captures 
regimes’ policy preferences (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017). If certain regime-types collects 
more money in income taxes than others, even when controlling for tax policy, this would be 
a very strong indication that the variation in collected income taxes is due to variation in the 
fiscal capacity of states, and not due to a variation in preferences. However, data on top 
marginal tax rates exists only for a small number of countries (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya look 
specifically at Europe, meaning that they can utilize the European Union data), which makes 
it impossible to include this as a control in the thesis. 
 
The expansion of the tax policy data to autocracies would be one of the several possible 
avenues for future research. Until then the results of this analysis should be interpreted 
cautiously. 
 
8.1.	Potential	selection	bias	
It is by now a well-established fact that many studies in comparative politics that investigates 
the effects of political regimes are highly sensitive to selection bias. One notable example is 
Ross (2006), who argued that many of the studies claiming to show that democracy has a 
positive effect on the welfare of the poorest in society are in fact driven by the exclusion of 
“high-performing” autocracies from their data. Given this, how certain can we be that the 
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results presented above are not just the product of a very particular sample, that differ in some 
fundamental way from the population as a whole? 
 
Although it is not entirely clear how to define the population (all autocratic country-years 
since the beginning of human civilization?) we can easily compare the sample of 1041 
observations with all non-democratic country-years included in the autocratic regime data-set 
for our chosen time-period, 1980-2010. The difference is displayed in Table 3 and 4. 
 
 
Table	3	Population	of	autocratic	country-years,	1980-2010	
 
 Eastern 
Europe 
/ USSR 
Latin 
America 
MENA Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
East Asia Southeast 
Asia 
South Asia Total 
Party  148 80 148 428 97 175 33 1109 
(48,3%) 
Personalist 136 25 86 429 0 7 12 695 
(30,2%) 
Military 0 75 21 96 8 42 19 261 
(11,4%) 
Monarchies 0 0 186 31 0 0 16 233 
(10,1%) 
Total 284 
(12,3%) 
180 
(7,8%) 
441 
(19,2%) 
984 
(42,8%) 
105 
(4,6%) 
224 
(9,7%) 
80 
(3,5%) 
2298 
(100%) 
 
Source: Geddes et al. (2014) Autocratic regime dataset. The regional divisions come from Hadenius and Teorell (2007). 
 
 
Table	4	Sample	of	autocratic	country-years	1980-2010	
 
 Eastern 
Europe 
/ USSR 
Latin 
America 
MENA Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
East Asia Southeast 
Asia 
South Asia Total 
Party  18 49 81 220 14 66 15 463 
(44,5 %) 
Personalist 89 18 11 206 0 1 0 325 
(31,2 %) 
Military 0 37 19 74 8 10 18 166 
(15,9 %) 
Monarchies 0 0 52 19 0 0 16 87 
(8,4 %) 
Total 107 
(10,3 %) 
104 
(10 %) 
163 
(15,7 %) 
519 
(49,9 %) 
22 
(2,1 %) 
77 
(7,4 %) 
49 
(4,7 %) 
1041 
(100 %) 
 
Source: Geddes et al. (2014) Autocratic regime dataset. The regional divisions come from Hadenius and Teorell (2007). 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, there was a total of 2298 non-democratic country-years in the period 
1980-2010, according to Geddes et al. classification. The total number of observations used in 
the regressions in section 7 is 1041 (Table 4), which represents slightly less than half (45 %) 
of all observations in the population.  
 
More interestingly, however, is whether there are any big, systematic differences in the 
relative importance of regime-types or regions between sample and population. At a first 
glance, this does not seem to be the case. The relative importance of different regime 
categories is roughly similar between the sample and the population: Party-based autocracies 
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and monarchies are slightly underrepresented, while military regimes are overrepresented 
(15,9 % of all observations in the sample, compared to 11,4 % in the population). The 
proportion of personalist regimes is very similar in the sample and in the population. 
 
Eastern Europe / former USSR account for 10,3 % of all observations in my sample, and 12,3 
% of all observations in the population. Latin America accounts for 10 % (compared to 7,8 % 
in the population) and the MENA-region for 15,7 % (19,2 % in the population). Africa makes 
up almost half of all observations in my sample (compared to 42,8 % in the population). The 
relative weight of Southeast Asia and South Asia is also rather similar in the sample and the 
population. One region however – East Asia – is heavily underrepresented. Representing 4,6 
% of all observations in the population, this drops to 2,1 % in the sample. In percentage-
points this is not a big difference, but in relative terms it is. The actual number of country-
years in East Asia drops from 105 in the population to 22 in the sample (almost an 80 % 
decrease). 
 
When we look at the various regime-types within regions, we notice some major differences 
between the sample and the population. The first thing that stands out is that the number of 
party-based autocratic country-years in Eastern Europe / USSR is very low in the sample (18), 
compared to the population (148). This is because almost all of the communist dictatorships 
in Eastern Europe / USSR-region are excluded from the sample19. 
 
Secondly, both monarchies and especially personalist regimes in the Middle East are 
underrepresented. Personalist regimes such as Yemen under president Saleh and Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein, as well as monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates are absent from the sample20. Thirdly, party-based regimes in East Asia are 
decidedly underrepresented (14 country years in the sample compared to 97 in the 
population). This is because Taiwan and North Korea are absent in the sample, and China and 
Mongolia and are only represented with a couple of years. 
 
Could the omitted observations lead us to under- or overestimate the effect of regime-type on 
taxation capacity? Although we cannot know for certain, we can make some qualified 
approximations. 
 
In the government revenue dataset, many of the communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe / 
USSR are among the best of all non-democratic countries at collecting income taxes. Thus, 
we can be certain that the empirical results presented above – showing that party-based 
regimes exhibit higher levels of taxation capacity than most other types of dictatorships – are 
not driven by the “high-performing” communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe. On the 
contrary, there is strong reason to believe that the effect of being a party-based dictatorship 
would be even stronger if the sample included more observations from countries such as 
Poland, Bulgaria and the USSR. 
 
																																																						
19 Even in the population as a whole, the number of party-based autocratic country-years in Eastern Europe / 
former USSR-region may seem low (148). This is because many countries which are today independent states – 
such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – were part of the USSR during the period 1980-1991. Thus, they are not 
included in the autocratic dataset. 
20 The fact that so many monarchies are dropped from the sample may be the biggest problem, since this is the 
least common form of autocracy. The sample only includes four monarchies – Jordan, Morocco, Nepal and 
Swaziland -  which together make up 87 of the 1041 observations. 
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While income taxation data is lacking for Iraq, Taiwan or North Korea, we know that the 
monarchies clustered around the Persian Gulf – such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United 
Arab Emirates – have virtually no revenue coming from income taxes at all. Thus, it is not 
impossible – although we cannot be certain – that the contrast between party-based 
autocracies and monarchies would increase if the “low-performing” monarchies of the Persian 
Gulf were included in the sample. As it is, the sample of 1041 observations include only four 
royal dictatorships: Morocco, Swaziland, Jordan and Nepal. Two of these – Morocco and 
Swaziland – collect rather large sums of money in income taxes, while the opposite is true for 
Jordan and Nepal. The low number of cases is likely the reason for why monarchies were not 
statistically significant in any of the model specifications. 
 
Another possibility is that the results presented in the section above is a consequence of the 
specific time-period chosen (1980-2010). For example, would the results change if the sample 
covered the whole period – assuming data was available – of 1946-2010? 
 
As shown by Geddes et al. (2014) the distribution of different autocratic regime types varies a 
lot over the post second world war era. For example, the prevalence of military regime peaked 
around 1980 and declined from there on. Party-based autocracy has remained the most 
common form of dictatorship for the whole period 1946-2010, but nevertheless declined by 
half after the end of the Cold War. By contrast, the proportion of personalist regimes has 
increased continuously since 1946, so that they today rival dominant-party rule as the most 
common form of dictatorship. The proportion of monarchies has remained more or less 
constant over the same time-period. 
 
Extending the time-period back to the end of the second world war would thus decrease the 
relative weight of personalist regimes, and probably slightly increase the relative weight of 
party-based and military regimes. It is difficult to speculate how these changes would affect 
the results. 
 
8.2.	Robustness	check	
As mentioned in section 4, Geddes et al. divides the world’s non-democracies into party-
based autocracies, military regimes, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic, indirect 
military, or hybrids of the first three. However, this thesis – just as most other comparative 
studies that build upon Geddes et al. work – utilizes the simplified regime categorization, 
which collapse all regimes into the four main types dominant-party, military, personalist and 
monarchy.  
 
Given the central role regime categorization plays for this thesis, I have rerun the regressions 
with all hybrid regimes and subtypes removed from the sample. This removes regimes that 
are somewhat hard to classify, and reduces the total number of observations with about 23 %. 
However, almost all of the dropped observations are coded as either party-based or military 
regimes. Military regimes are specially affected by the removal of hybrids and subtypes, 
going from 166 observations to 65 (see Table 7 in the appendix for details). 
 
Table 8 in the appendix shows the regression results without any hybrid regimes. The 
coefficients for regime-types are significant and quite similar in terms of magnitude of the 
effect to those reported in Table 2. In other words, the data provides support for H1. At the 
same time, while the personalist regime category is still statistically significant, military 
regimes are not. Thus, while we can still say with confidence that party-based dictatorships 
display higher levels of taxation capacity than personalist regimes, we can no longer say the 
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same for military regimes with any certainty21. As in previous regressions, monarchies remain 
statistically non-significant. 
 
The likely reason for why military regimes are non-significant when removing hybrid regimes 
and subtypes is the low number of observations (65 out of 802). The fact that the coefficients 
for military regimes stay quite similar both with and without hybrids and subtypes indicate 
that the problem is too few observations, not that the overall pattern regarding taxation 
capacity for party-based and military regimes is dependent on a specific sample. Put 
differently, I would be much more worried if the coefficient for military regimes changed 
dramatically – for example if the coefficient became positive, or if the size of the effect 
became much bigger or smaller – with a reduced sample. 
 
8.3.	Conclusion	
This thesis set out to investigate if different types of dictatorships construct their state 
apparatuses in different ways, resulting in higher or lower levels of state capacity. Using 
income taxes as share of GDP as a proxy for the effectiveness of the tax system, the thesis 
hypothesized that party-based autocracies display higher levels of fiscal capacity compared to 
other forms of autocracies. The hypothesis was derived from the extensive political science 
literature on dictatorships and on state capacity, and focused on three factors: Rulers’ time-
horizons; their incentives; and how institutions shape the dynamics between rulers and their 
“elite coalitions”. 
 
Using a time-series analysis with panel data, covering 80 countries for the time-period 1980-
2010, I found clear support for the hypothesis, even when controlling for GDP per capita, 
population density, state antiquity, regime duration and several others potentially important 
factors. However, while the results showed that military and personalist regimes clearly 
derived less money from income taxes than party-based regimes, the analysis showed no 
systematic difference between monarchies (the least common form of autocracy) and party-
based dictatorships (the most common form of autocracy). 
 
As always, the results should be interpreted with caution. The study suffers from at least three 
potential weaknesses: Firstly, it is possible that the dependent variable – income tax revenue 
as share of GDP – do not actually capture the fiscal capacity of the state, but rather rulers’ tax 
preferences. This problem is inherent in much of the research on state capacity, since there is 
a difference between an outcome, and the ability to achieve said outcome. Secondly – even 
though I find it unlikely – it is possible that the results are driven by selection bias. Thirdly, 
one could also question the coding of autocratic regimes, done by Geddes et al. As the 
discussion in section 8.2. above suggests, the results are at least partly sensitive to regime-
coding. 
 
All these issues represent avenues for future research. For example, future research could try 
to include a control-variable that captures tax preferences; employ indicators that does not 
measure an outcome but rather the resources of the state; or increase the geographical and/or 
temporal scope of the study. All things considered, the variation in state capacity amongst 
dictatorships appears to be an important research gap. As far as I know, there exists no 
published studies that investigates the variation in taxation capacity amongst dictatorships. 
This thesis is a small contribution to this emerging strand of research.  
																																																						
21 It should be noted that party-based and personalist autocracies are by far the most common forms of 
dictatorships in the post-Cold War era, making up more than three fourths of all dictatorships. 
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10.	Appendix	
 
Table	5	Summary	statistics,	independent	and	dependent	variables	
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Source 
Income-taxes, share of GDP (log) 1041 1.169 0.64 -2.392 2.846 ICTD Gov. Revenue Dataset 
Party 1041 0.445 0.497 0 1 Geddes et al. (2014) 
Personalist 1041 0.312 0.464 0 1 Geddes et al. (2014) 
Military 1041 0.159 0.366 0 1 Geddes et al. (2014) 
Monarchy 1041 0.083 0.277 0 1 Geddes et al. (2014) 
GDP pc. (log) 1041 7.717 0.956 5.726 10.106 Gleditch (XXXX) 
Regime duration (log) 1041 2.673 1.015 0 4.443 Geddes et al. (2014) 
Population density (log) 1041 3.67 1.301 0.356 8.676 WDI (XXXX) 
Political rights 1041 2.652 1.399 1 7 Freedom House (XXXX) 
Oil-rents (log) 1041 -3.53 4.44 -7.343 4.27 WDI (XXX) 
Aid, share of GDP (log) 1041 10.07 1.516 2.515 13.321 AidData (XXX) & Gleditch (XXXX) 
International wars (log) 1041 0.607 0.961 0 3.584 Correlates of War Project (XXXX) 
State antiquity index (10 % disc) 1041 258.45 125.414 25 512.41 Putterman (2007) 
Region, Eastern Europe / USSR 1041 0.103 0.304 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
Region, Latin America 1041 0.099 0.3 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
Region, MENA 1041 0.156 0.364 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
Region, Sub-Saharan Africa 1041 0.498 0.5 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
Region, East Asia 1041 0.021 0.144 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
Region, South East Asia 1041 0.074 0.262 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
Region, South Asia 1041 0.047 0.212 0 1 Hadenius & Teorell 2007 
 
Note: Some of the variables used as predictors have the value “0” for certain observations. This represents a problem when logging these 
variables, since the natural logarithm of zero is undefined. When logging such a variable, this means that an observation with the value “0” 
instead gets a missing value, thus leading to fewer observations overall. To counteract this, half of the smallest value greater than zero was 
added to all observation for the variables income taxes, GDP per capita, regime duration, population density, oil-rents and aidshare. After 
that, the natural logarithm for these variables was generated. For the years of international wars-variable all values were increased by one 
before logging. 
  
The political rights index from Freedom House has been inverted, so that higher values indicate more political freedom. 
 
 
 
 
Table	6	List	of	countries	
 
Albania Guatemala Pakistan 
Algeria Guinea Panama 
Angola Haiti Paraguay 
Armenia Indonesia Peru 
Azerbaijan Iran Philippines 
Bangladesh Jordan Russia 
Belarus Kazakhstan Rwanda 
Benin Kenya Senegal 
Botswana Korea, South Sierra Leone 
Burkina Faso Kyrgyzstan Singapore 
Burundi Laos South Africa 
Cambodia Lesotho Sri Lanka 
Cameroon Liberia Swaziland 
Central African Republic Libya Syria 
Chad Madagascar Tajikistan 
Chile Malawi Thailand 
China Malaysia Togo 
Congo Mali Tunisia 
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania Turkey 
Cuba Mexico Turkmenistan 
Egypt Mongolia Uganda 
El Salvador Morocco Uruguay 
Ethiopia Mozambique Uzbekistan 
Gabon Nepal Venezuela 
Gambia Nicaragua Zambia 
Georgia Niger Zimbabwe 
Ghana Nigeria  
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Table	7	Sample	of	autocratic	country-years,	without	any	hybrids	or	subtypes	
 
 Eastern 
Europe 
/ USSR 
Latin 
America 
MENA Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
East Asia Southeast 
Asia 
South Asia Total 
Party-based  4 29 38 168 14 58 15 326 
(40,6 %) 
Personalist 89 18 11 205 0 1 0 324 
(40,4 %) 
Military 0 19 19 17 8 1 1 65 
(8,1 %) 
Monarchies 0 0 52 19 0 0 16 87 
(10,8 %) 
Total 93 
(11,6 %) 
66 
(8,2 %) 
120 
(15 %) 
409 
(51 %) 
22 
(2,7 %) 
60 
(7,5 %) 
32 
(4 %) 
802 
(100 %) 
 
 
 
Table	8	Regression	results,	without	any	hybrids	or	subtypes	
 
Income-taxes (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Personalist -0.217* -0.188* -0.19* -0.19* -0.198* -0.218* 
Military -0.202 -0.212 -0.212 -0.22 -0.228 -0.21 
Monarchy -0.028 -0.038 -0.039 -0.029 0.03 0.13 
       
GDP pc. (log)  0.191*** 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.202*** 
Regime duration (log)  -0.011 -0.019 -0.001 -0.009 -0.014 
Population density (log)  0.009 0.001 0.012 0.022 0.059 
Political rights   -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 
Oil-rents (log)    0.005 0.008 0.005 
Aid, share of GDP (log)    0.0004 0.00001 0.0009 
Years of international wars (log)     0.08 0.047 
State antiquity index (10 % disc)     -0.001 -0.001 
       
Region, Eastern Europe / USSR      0.165 
Region, Latin America      -0.337 
Region, MENA      0.009 
Region, East Asia      0.453 
Region, South East Asia      -0.175 
Region, South Asia      -0.66 
       
Constant 1.081 -0.38 -0.369 -0.332 -0.167 -0.304 
R2 (overall) 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.32 
Observations 802 802 802 802 802 802 
Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Years (maximum) 30 30 30 30 30 30 
 
*p£0.05 **p£0.01 ***p£0.001 
All models include dummies (not reported in the table) for all years in the sample except one (1980). 
The reference-category for regime-types is party-based regimes. The reference-category for regions is Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
		
Table	9	Correlation	matrix	
 
 Party Personal Military Monarch GDP pc Regime 
duration 
Population 
density 
Political 
rights 
Oil-rents Aid, share of 
GDP 
Party 1,000          
Personal -0,603 1,000         
Military -0,390 -0,294 1,000        
Monarch -0,270 -0,204 -0,132 1,000       
GDP pc 0,284 -0,235 -0,132 0,058 1,000      
Regime duration 0,419 -0,320 -0,355 0,253 0,306 1,000     
Population density -0,067 -0,098 0,125 0,120 -0,093 -0,064 1,000    
Political rights 0,109 -0,132 -0,061 0,105 0,127 0,105 -0,033 1,000   
Oil-rents 0,169 -0,051 -0,035 -0,172 0,517 0,160 -0,146 -0,194 1,000  
Aid, share of GDP -0,206 0,149 0,040 0,066 -0,692 -0,153 -0,121 0,090 -0,512 1,000 
Years of int, Wars 0,083 -0,246 0,101 0,130 0,231 0,260 0,144 0,018 0,203 -0,265 
State antiquity index -0,003 -0,167 0,071 0,192 0,174 0,143 0,279 0,046 0,265 -0,279 
Region, Eastern Europe / USSR -0,188 0,380 -0,147 -0,102 0,231 -0,270 -0,011 -0,052 0,254 -0,214 
Region, Latin America 0,018 -0,100 0,179 -0,101 0,202 -0,022 0,050 0,126 0,080 -0,112 
Region, MENA 0,045 -0,228 -0,051 0,367 0,245 0,315 -0,011 -0,089 0,346 -0,189 
Region, Sub-Saharan Africa -0,042 0,182 -0,046 -0,169 -0,534 -0,101 -0,268 -0,047 -0,422 0,481 
Region, East Asia 0,057 -0,099 0,082 -0,044 0,106 0,150 0,117 -0,011 0,006 -0,157 
Regoin, South East Asia 0,235 -0,183 -0,023 -0,085 0,182 0,119 0,211 -0,003 -0,010 -0,208 
Region, South Asia -0,062 -0,150 0,126 0,195 -0,074 -0,133 0,257 0,172 -0,065 0,018 
 
Note: The table continues on the next page. 
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Table	9	Correlation	matrix,	continued	
 
 Years of int, 
Wars 
State 
antiquity 
index 
Region, 
Eastern 
Europe / 
USSR 
Region, Latin 
America 
Region, 
MENA 
Region, Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Region, East 
Asia 
Regoin, South 
East Asia 
Region, South 
Asia 
Years of int, Wars 1,000         
State antiquity index 0,556 1,000        
Region, Eastern Europe / USSR -0,096 0,058 1,000       
Region, Latin America 0,264 -0,034 -0,113 1,000      
Region, MENA 0,255 0,390 -0,146 -0,144 1,000     
Region, Sub-Saharan Africa -0,487 -0,613 -0,338 -0,332 -0,430 1,000    
Region, East Asia 0,337 0,265 -0,050 -0,049 -0,063 -0,147 1,000   
Regoin, South East Asia 0,199 0,232 -0,096 -0,094 -0,122 -0,282 -0,042 1,000  
Region, South Asia 0,003 0,276 -0,075 -0,074 -0,096 -0,222 -0,033 -0,063 1,000 
 
 
 
	Figure	2	Fitted	values	against	residuals	
	
 
 
